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Objective. To determine whether managed mental health care for Medicaid enrollees
in King County, Washington, has led to indirect cost-shifting to substitute treatments,
such as jails and state mental hospitals that are free goods to providers.
Data Sources. Complete service records for 47,300 adults who used at least one of the
following systems from 1993 to 1998: King County jail system, Medicaid, or the King
County mental health system. Data were also obtained from the Washington State
Hospital System.
Study Design. A quasi-experimental analysis that compares the difference in out-
comes between the pre- and post-managed care periods for Medicaid enrollees com-
pared to non-Medicaid enrollees. The outcomes——jail costs, state hospital costs, and
county outpatient mental health costs——were estimated with two-part difference-in-dif-
ferences models. The regressions control for person-level fixed effects on up to 66
months of data per person.
Data Collection Methods. Administrative data were collected from the jail, Med-
icaid, and mental health systems, then merged and cleaned. Additional data on costs
were obtained in interviews.
Principal Findings. There is a striking increase in the probability of jail use for per-
sons on Medicaid following the introduction of managed care. There was a significant
decrease in expenditures in the county mental health system for outpatient care.
Conclusions. Managed care led to indirect cost-shifting, probably through poor access
to services, which may have led to an increased probability of jail detention.
Key Words. Mental health, jail, managed care, Medicaid
The fates of mentally ill persons have always been intertwined with the shifting
boundaries between the criminal justice and mental health systems. Just as
public mental hospitals once served as the institutions of last resort for the care
and confinement of mentally ill persons, jails have become the last secure
environment in most communities for the control of mentally ill persons when
they are unmanageable and noncompliant. The U.S. Justice Department has
reported that nearly 284,000 people with mental illnesses were in jail or prison
on any given day——about 16 percent of the incarcerated population and more
than four times the resident census in state mental hospitals (Ditton 1999). The
1379
presence of mentally ill persons in jails is not a new problem——it has been
around for the 200 years since the beginnings of organized efforts to improve
the care of mentally disordered persons in the United States (Grob 1994).
Overlying the jail and public mental health systems is managed care,
which has spread rapidly during the past decade throughout the behavioral
health care system. Managed care carve-outs may lead to cost-shifting, defined
as one agency reducing its own expenditures by inducing another agency to
pay for similar services (Norton, Lindrooth, and Dickey 1997, 1999). Cost-
shifting may happen when two different agencies offer treatments that are
substitutes and the treatment is paid for out of different budgets. For example,
in a mental health carve-out, the managed care organization may be able to
direct patients to receive care in mental hospitals paid for by the state, thereby
reducing its own expenditures while increasing expenditures for care not
covered through the mental health carve-out. This meaning is distinct from
hospitals raising private reimbursement rates in response to lower public re-
imbursement rates, the traditional definition of cost-shifting in the health care
literature (e.g., Sloan, 1983; Sloan, Morrisey, and Valvona 1988; Dranove
1988).
In the context of jails, it is perhaps more precise to call this phenomenon
indirect cost-shifting from service providers to the jail since neither they nor the
managed care organization directly place anyone in jail. However, providers
that intentionally or unintentionally underserve selected clients may place
these clients in situations where their behavior comes to the attention of police
officers through various types of public disturbances——dining and dashing,
urinating in public, panhandling too aggressively——increasing the probability
of being arrested and booked into jail. While in the community, all mental
health services used by these persons are covered by their insurers or pro-
viders, but while in jail they are off-budget from the providers’ perspective.
We will test for indirect cost-shifting in one county mental health pro-
gram that was one of the first public programs to switch to managed care. King
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County, Washington, which includes Seattle, shifted to a county-level risk-
bearing contract in the Medicaid program in April 1995. The use of managed
mental health care in public programs such as Medicaid has grown tremen-
dously since this time. As of 1999, 42 states had used some type of managed
behavioral health care in their public mental health systems (Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration 2000). We will test for indirect
cost shifting using person-level data on jail, state mental hospital, and outpa-
tient community mental health utilization from 1993 to 1998. The study design
is a pre–post quasi-experiment; we estimate difference-in-differences models.
Because jails are a form of institutional setting, evidence of cost-shifting
to the jail sector may indicate a movement toward reinstitutionalization, albeit
on a much shorter-term scale than the traditional use of this term. This finding
would suggest an unintended reversal of deinstitutionalization observed over
the past thirty years from state mental hospitals to community-based treatment
settings (Mechanic and Rochfort 1990).
BACKGROUND
The care and treatment of mentally ill persons in America has always been
closely tied to financing between federal, state, and local governments (Grob
1994). Recently, states have been able to pass many of the costs for mental
health services along to the federal government (Frank, Goldman, and Hogan
2003). This opportunity occurred with the passage of the Medicare and Med-
icaid amendments to the Social Security Act in the late 1960s. The legislation
specifically prohibited payments to the states for the care of persons between
the ages of 18 and 64 years of age while they resided in a state mental hospital.
However, financial incentives were created that led to the release of many
thousands of long-stay patients from state mental hospitals to nursing homes
and other community settings. While these patients remained in state hospi-
tals, the state funded 100 percent of their costs. Once in the community,
federal Medicaid and Medicare largely supported the costs of their mental
health care while their housing and income were subsidized by federal Sup-
plemental Security Income (SSI) payments. These incentives fueled rapid
deinstitutionalization from state mental hospitals beginning in the early 1970s
(Gronfein 1985). In the process, hundreds of thousands of long-stay patients
were moved to nursing homes, community care homes, and to the streets
where the costs of their care were absorbed by local welfare systems, police,
jails, and other criminal justice agencies (Morrissey 1982).
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Our study population in King County, Washington, allows us the unique
opportunity to examine the effect of a transfer in risk for mental health services
from the state to the provider level. Before April 1995, outpatient mental
health service providers billed the state on a fee-for-service basis for Medicaid
and uninsured individuals. On April 1, 1995, the state put King County at risk
for outpatient services and the county responded by immediately shifting the
risk to local provider groups through a form of capitated contracts called case-
rate payments. Each year, enrollees are assigned to one of several fixed
monthly payment amounts depending on their severity of illness. King Coun-
ty also contracted with a private sector insurer to manage and administer the
capitated payment system. We will not be able to identify the separate effects
of provider capitation and the Administrative Services Only (ASO) contract
that occurred simultaneously, but instead treat this as one policy change. We
refer to this policy change as managed care, since the change in structure gave
providers the incentive to manage outpatient care.
At the level of the managed care plan, two types of cost-shifting can be
distinguished——within-plan and out-of-plan. Within-plan cost shifting reduces
costs by substituting less intensive services for more intensive services, for the
same payer. One example is if the county switches from expensive inpatient
treatment to outpatient treatment, when both types of treatment are paid for
by the county. Out-of-plan cost shifting happens when utilization shifts away
from the managed care plan to other entities. An example is if patients are
moved from inpatient care paid by the county to state mental hospitals paid by
the state.
Within-plan cost-shifting has been widely documented under various
managed care arrangements for Medicaid behavioral health services (Chris-
tianson et al. 1995; Callahan et al. 1995; Dickey et al. 1996; Stroup and
Dorwart 1995; McFarland, Johnson, and Hornbrook 1996; Popkin et al. 1998;
Liu et al. 1999; Warner and Huxley 1998). One of the most consistent findings
is that capitation lowers Medicaid costs by decreasing the use of expensive
services like hospitalization while promoting less expensive outpatient treat-
ment.
Out-of-plan cost-shifting, however, has been less studied and less is
known about its occurrence, structure, or dynamics. Schlesinger, Wynia, and
Cummins (2000) explain that there is an unusually large potential for out-of-
plan cost-shifting in the treatment of mental illness in comparison to other
medical conditions. They point to two systems that managed behavioral
health care arrangements can cost shift to. The first is the existence of a
well-established system of treatment financed and managed by the state
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government (Edmunds et al. 1997). The second is the availability of
informal sources of care such as family members who are the primary
caregivers for many people with serious mental illness (Arno, Levine, and
Memmott 1999; Mueser et al. 1996). Both situations create incentives for
capitated providers to make greater use of these extra-plan resources, thereby
shortening stays in community hospitals or other covered residential care
facilities that significantly reduce plan costs. In the present study, we extend to
this set of systems the county jail, which is a ‘‘free good’’ to behavioral health
providers.
Earlier work by Norton, Lindrooth, and Dickey (1999) remains among
the few studies of out-of-plan cost-shifting in managed behavioral health care.
They conducted a study of the change from fee-for-service to managed care for
mental health services in the Massachusetts Medicaid program. They tested
for cost-shifting by estimating expenditures for five specific services paid by
three public agencies. Expenditures on services paid by the managed care
vendor decreased, and expenditures paid by Medicaid increased. The effects
were generally stronger for the beneficiaries in the highest quartile of expen-
ditures. In another study of cost-shifting, Norton, Lindrooth, and Dickey
(1997) found only limited evidence for children, although average annual
expenditures on children were only one-third as large, mitigating the possi-
bility of finding cost-shifting. Cuffel, Goldman, and Schlesinger (1999) have
studied cost-shifting in the private sector, where a carve-out program provided
incentives to shift costs from behavioral care to medical care. They find that
the rate of behavioral care use remained the same, while medical care de-
clined. Grazier and Pollack (2000) studied cost-shifting in a mental health
carve-out of a major private employer. Overall, they found a slight reduction
in costs and utilization, but for persons with high utilization, the financial
incentives increased greatly.
HYPOTHESES
We analyze indirect cost-shifting in this study from the perspective of the
agencies funding services. Expenditures for nonmental health services and
mental health services provided by payers other than those in the managed
outpatient system should increase after managed mental health care is imple-
mented because the managed care providers pay nothing for these services,
while expenditures for mental health services provided by the capitated pro-
viders should decrease.
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Both the jail and the state mental hospitals are substitutes for outpatient
care and are free goods from the perspective of the managed care providers.
Under these circumstances, providers can be expected to decrease use of
managed services, resulting in an increase of nonmanaged services. This leads
us to the following hypotheses:
Managed mental health care will
1. increase the cost of jails,
2. increase the cost of state mental hospitals, and
3. decrease the cost of outpatient mental health services.
METHODS
We test for indirect cost-shifting onto jails and the state mental hospitals after
the introduction of managed care. The hypotheses to be tested are whether
managed care leads to an increase in costs of these two kinds of institutions.
Because utilization can increase in two ways——either the probability of any use
of services or the intensity or amount of use conditional on any use can
change——we estimate two-part expenditure models at the person level (Duan
1983; Duan et al. 1984). In the two-part model, the first model predicts the
probability of having any costs. The second part predicts the cost conditional
on receiving the service. The basic model specification is:
Part 1 : Prðyit > 0Þ ¼ b0 þ bMCM MCt Mi þ bMC MCt þ bXit þ mi þ eit
Part 2 : Eðyit jyit > 0Þ ¼ b0 þ bMCM MCt Mi þ bMC MCt þ bXit þ mi þ eit
where y is one of five dependent variables measuring cost, i is the subscript for
individuals and t is the subscript for time, the vector MC represents the period
during which managed care was implemented, the vector X includes time-
varying observable individual characteristics and time trends, b are the pa-
rameters to be estimated, m are time-invariant unobserved individual char-
acteristics, including M, an indicator of Medicaid enrollment, and e are
random error terms. Although we could estimate a binary model such as a
logit or probit for the first part, we choose to estimate a linear probability
model because this will make the interpretation of the variables with inter-
action terms easier (Ai and Norton 2003). One problem with linear probability
models can be predictions outside the unit interval; fortunately, in our models
all predictions were within 0.0016 of the unit interval, except in the county
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mental health model, in which all predictions were within 0.0115 of the unit
interval.
The study design compares the difference in outcomes between the pre-
and post-managed care periods for Medicaid enrollees to the difference in
outcomes between the pre- and post-managed care periods for non-Medicaid
enrollees. This study design is often called a difference-in-differences model.
The non-Medicaid enrollees are the control group, because changes in Med-
icaid policy should only affect persons enrolled in the Medicaid program,
unless these effects spillover to non-Medicaid enrollees. We can think of few
plausible arguments for spillover effects of this administrative change to King
County residents not enrolled in the Medicaid program; the exceptions being
capacity constraints and possible decreases in the amount of resources for the
uninsured if Medicaid spending increases (e.g., Frank, Goldman, and Hogan
2003). In fact, we have some preliminary information from related work that
King County may have reinvested some of their behavioral health savings
from implementing managed care to expand their service basis beyond
the Medicaid population. Any unmeasured spillover effects such as these
would bias the Medicaid interaction term towards zero, understating the
actual results.
We estimated five different two-part models. The first four models
measure the extent of cost-shifting at the person level for each of four specific
services (nonpsychiatric jail hotel costs, psychiatric jail hotel costs, jail mental
health services costs, and state hospital costs); the fifth two-part model esti-
mates the own-cost savings to the county outpatient mental system. In each
regression, the variable of primary interest is the interaction between the
Medicaid population indicator and the managed care period indicator be-
cause it indicates the additional change that the shift to managed care had on
the Medicaid population. A positive and significant coefficient for this inter-
action in the first-part model on jail services would indicate that managed care
is associated with a greater likelihood that an individual is in jail in any given
month. The same positive coefficient in the second part of the model would
indicate that the carve-out is associated with higher jail costs per month, given
some use of the jail system. We also test for time trends and allow for a separate
time trend after the start of managed care.
There are repeated monthly observations on each person——up to 66
months per person——so we use person-level fixed-effects models to control for
person-level unobserved factors that affect utilization. Not controlling for un-
observed person-level time-invariant effects may bias the estimated coeffi-
cients and standard errors. Fixed-effects models are commonly used in health
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economics when the data are longitudinal and have the advantage of not
assuming that the time-invariant person-specific effects are uncorrelated with
the other covariates. We also run all models using individual characteristics
rather than fixed effects (results not reported) and obtain similar findings.
DATA
Sample
The study includes a random sample of all persons who have ever used one of
three systems at some point during 1993–1998; these three systems are the jail
system in King County, Washington, the Medicaid system, and the King
County mental health system. Complete records of all persons with an en-
counter with at least one of these three systems were obtained from the rel-
evant agencies. These lists were combined to generate a master list of unique
individuals (Morrissey et al. 2002). From this list a stratified random sample
was drawn independent of the level of service use. Users of certain system
combinations (e.g., jail and county mental health or jail and Medicaid) were
oversampled. The final sample size has 47,300 unique individuals aged 18–64,
with up to 66 monthly observations per person, 21 before the carve-out and
45 after. Because of persons aging in or out of our sample by turning 18
after the beginning of the sample period or turning 65 before the end of
the sample period, our final sample has just under 2.6 million person-month
observations.
Data on jail utilization, health services provided in jail, state mental
hospital utilization, and utilization of county mental health (outpatient) serv-
ices were obtained from the relevant King County and state authorities. Costs
per unit of service were assigned according to the methods described below.
All costs are inflated by the overall consumer price index and are expressed in
2001 dollars.
Mental Health Services and Institutions in King County
King County shares a number of features with other geographic areas of the
United States that make our results relevant outside this limited geographic
area. In 1998, at the end of our sample, Washington State was one of almost
three-fourths (72 percent) of states that had managed behavioral health waiv-
ers in their Medicaid programs; more than half of Medicaid enrollees nation-
wide were in managed behavioral health programs in that year (Findlay 1999;
Frank, Goldman, and Hogan 2003). As in King County, the vast majority of
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publicly funded plans were not full-risk plans (Findlay 1999). King County was
the twelfth largest county in the United States in 2001 and had jail detention
rates greater than the national average (688–723 versus 564–648 per 100,000
from 1994–1998).
During our study period, there were other sectors and providers in-
volved in the provision of mental health treatment to this population that are
not reflected in this analysis. In addition to the two state-funded psychiatric
facilities, at least 15 general medical hospitals provided some inpatient be-
havioral health services in this population (American Hospital Association
1994–2000). Private specialty mental health as well as general primary care
providers provided a wide array of mental health treatments not captured in
our current data. The number of nonfederal psychiatrists providing patient
care in King County was relatively stable over our period, increasing from 335
in 1993 to 347 in 1998 (National Center for Health Workforce Information
and Analysis 2001; Office of Research and Planning 1995–2000).
As in most communities, the local law enforcement departments in King
County often provide triage services for the mentally ill, affecting the prob-
abilities that persons are referred or diverted from jail for minor infractions.
Before July 1997 there were no special mental health initiatives to our knowl-
edge that would affect the probability of going to jail. Beginning July 1997,
two new initiatives were implemented that might affect the probability of
having one or more jail visits. On this date, the King County Mental Health
system established a crisis triage unit to divert mentally ill persons from both
psychiatric hospitals and jails to outpatient treatment. Also at this time, the
Seattle police department initiated a crisis intervention team consisting of
officers trained to work closely with the mental health system to better triage
nonviolent mentally ill persons. In addition, a mental health court system was
implemented in King County after our study period (1999); future research on
a longer data panel will examine the effect of this policy on jail detentions of
the mentally ill.
While the probability of receiving jail and specialty mental health serv-
ices may have changed as a result of these policies, we do not explicitly control
for these in our analyses since there is no reason to believe that these policies
disproportionately affected either our cases or our control group. Policies such
as police triaging procedures in place in King County during our study period
were not limited to Medicaid enrollees, and thus should not bias our results. In
addition, our models include an overall time trend and a separate time trend
for the managed care period, so that gradual changes both before and after the
policy change will be captured.
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Choice-based Sampling
The data for this study were drawn using choice-based, rather than population-
based, sampling. This approach is preferable to population-based sampling
because the receipt of mental health and jail services are fairly low-incident
events and thus would require a larger, costlier data collection endeavor to
obtain a large enough sample of service users. The choice-based sampling
approach used here requires the use of an appropriate weighting scheme to
obtain consistent maximum likelihood estimates (Manski and Lerman 1977).
We modify the approach suggested by Cosslett (1981), by using information
from the sample to generate estimates of the population shares for each time
period. The weight for each observation is the ratio of the population share of
each choice to the sample share. Choice is defined as one of eight possible
combinations of the three service systems ( jail, county mental health, and
Medicaid). The weights are calculated each period.
Although calculating the sample share for each choice is straightforward,
we did not have information on the population share in each time period, but
only had access to a weighting system for the population of persons who had
ever used any of the service systems during the study period. The population
share was developed as follows. We obtained an estimate of the number of
persons in each system category in each month by multiplying the probability
of each choice each time period conditional on ever using each system com-
bination by the number of persons ever in each system combination. We then
estimated the number of persons aged 18–64 in King County in each month,
from the U.S. Census annual estimates by assuming a constant monthly rate of
growth between years, and assuming that this age group comprised exactly
63.1 percent of the county population, as they did for the Washington state
population in the 2000 Decennial Census (U.S. Census Bureau 2002). From
these two sets of estimates we obtained the population share of each system
combination for each time point during our sample.
Jail Costs
We estimate the effect of managed care on monthly average costs to the jail
system. Jail costs were split into four categories. We first divide costs into two
groups: hotel costs, which refer to all non-health-related costs including hous-
ing, feeding, and guarding detainees, and the costs of health care services
provided in the jail. This distinction is useful in these data because two separate
agencies are at risk for these costs. Jail hotel costs are funded by the King
County Department of Adult Corrections while jail health costs are funded by
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the King County/Seattle Department of Public Health (DPH), which finances
the providers and supplies for services delivered in the jail. Jail costs of both
categories were further divided into psychiatric costs and nonpsychiatric costs.
Jail hotel psychiatric costs were identified through the use of separate units for
detainees that assessed positively for a potential mental illness. Jail psychiatric
service costs are identified through the use of any mental health diagnosis on
the encounter form generated by DPH staff, regardless of the procedure code
indicated. The two most common diagnosis codes used in the data were for
schizophrenia (unspecified) and major affective disorder: manic; these two
codes were present on over 35 percent of all DPH encounters. Nonpsychiatric
health costs are not considered in this study.
Jail hotel costs of both types were quantified through a two-part pro-
cedure. First, a booking rate was charged to all new jail admissions in the
month during which the admission occurred. Second, the total number of jail
days was multiplied by an average cost per day. Separate, higher costs for
psychiatric jail days were used to reflect the increased intensity of services
provided to detainees in the psychiatric units. Jail authorities in King County
have estimated that days in psychiatric units are 3.225 times as expensive as in
nonpsychiatric units. We use this figure and the average daily jail costs to
calculate the per diem costs for both types of jail stays. Booking rate and
average cost per day are often used by King County to charge other counties
for the detainment of non-King County residents.
Jail mental health services were assigned the rate commonly received by
DPH in other settings. The DPH uses a Current Procedural Terminology
(CPT)-based system, and reimbursement strongly resembles rates used for
Medicaid reimbursement. In cases where DPH reimbursement rates were
missing (69 percent of all encounters), unit costs were assigned by first ex-
amining whether there were other nonmissing costs for the same CPT code in
the same year (36.6 percent of estimated DPH encounters). When these costs
were missing for all observations in a year (58.7 percent of all DPH estimated
encounters), unit costs were assigned according to the rates paid by the
Washington State Medicaid program in 2001. The remaining (4.7 percent) of
encounters with missing costs could not be matched and were set equal to zero;
the vast majority of these services are for things that would ordinarily not be
reimbursed through a Medicaid system (e.g., consultation with other providers).
The cost to DPH of psychotropic medications for detainees is also in-
cluded in jail mental health services costs. Because none of our data provided
information on the actual users of psychotropic medications, we divided the
full amount paid by DPH for psychotropic drugs by the total number of DPH
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encounters in each year. This per encounter cost is then added into the cost of
each psychiatric encounter thus explicitly distributing psychotropic drug ex-
penditures to higher service users. Actual expenditures were only available for
1998. Psychotropic expenditures for all years prior to 1998 were estimated to
have the same real spending as in 1998. While this is a somewhat unrealistic
assumption due to the large rate of inflation on drug products, the jail system
has been increasingly successful in receiving donated medications, thus bal-
ancing out the large increases in spending. The estimated drug cost per en-
counter ranged from $16.06 in 1993 to $33.87 in 1998.
Other Costs
State mental hospital costs were assigned using the annual per diem amounts
for the two large state mental hospitals. One hospital provides an assisted
living unit; costs for this unit were also included at its separate per diem rate.
Costs to the county mental health system were enumerated as actual
expenditures, rather than using a shadow claim procedure. Before managed
care, providers were paid on a fee-for-service basis. Therefore, service codes
for the pre-period were matched to reimbursement rates for those service
codes, or when the rates were not available, translated to CPT codes and
linked to the 2001 Washington Medicaid reimbursement rates per procedure.
Two kinds of services were given cost values of $0: services that could not be
matched to a service code reimbursement rate or to a CPT code or those that
were matched to CPT codes not reimbursed by the Washington Medicaid
program. We use actual capitation payments to determine costs after managed
care was implemented in April 1995. Monthly payments were made to pro-
viders based on an assessment of the severity of illness, the patient’s age group
(child, adult, or geriatric), and sex. Encounters with capitated providers were
not consistently reported so only actual payments are used. In addition, more
than 12,000 person-months contained some use of the county mental health
system outside of a capitated contract; these visits were very often for persons
who were covered under a capitated contract within one month of their visit.
Costs were assigned to these cases according to the pre-managed care method
described above.
Costs were summed separately for each type of service to the person-
month level. That is, each dependent variable described below is the total cost
for that type of service per individual per month.
Unweighted averages for each variable are described in Table 1.
The first and second columns of the table give the percentage of users and
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person-months during our sample period that had any positive level of use.
The third and fourth columns give the average and standard deviation of the
level of use, measured in 2001 dollars, conditional on any use in the month.
The five dependent variables used in our regression models are reported in the
rows. These variables include the jail hotel costs for psychiatric and nonpsy-
chiatric care, jail mental health services costs, state mental hospital costs, and
county outpatient mental health costs. Just over 3 percent of person-months
had some nonpsychiatric jail use and less than 1 percent of person-months
had any jail psychiatric, jail mental health service, or state mental hospital use.
Almost 15 percent of the sample person-months used county outpatient men-
tal health services.
Costs of the psychiatric unit of the jail were substantially higher ($1,756/
month for users) than nonpsychiatric costs ($670/month for users) as de-
scribed above. Jail mental health service costs averaged $156 per month con-
ditional on use. State mental hospital costs averaged over $8,000 per month
with some use, while county mental health users averaged $381 per month.
Table 2 describes the explanatory variables used in the fixed-effects
models. Regressors include an indicator for months after the shift to manage
care occurred and a linear time trend. An indicator for persons who were ever
enrolled in Medicaid during the study period was included to isolate the effects
of the change for the population most likely to be affected. A new jail was
opened in King County in the spring of 1997. This occurrence may have
reduced capacity constraints, allowing for changes in the rate and level of jail
use, so a variable indicating the time period after the new jail opened was
included in all jail models. Age, sex, and race variables are also reported,














Nonpsychiatric 42.8 3.40 656.27 651.46
Psychiatric 12.8 0.66 1756.62 1896.25
Jail Mental Health Services Costs 14.6 0.72 156.10 118.86
State Hospital Costs 3.4 0.55 8034.52 3774.52
County Mental Health Costs 50.9 14.85 381.09 649.63
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although only age appears in the fixed-effects models because the other de-
mographic variables do not change over time.
RESULTS
The key results are the coefficients on the interaction between managed care
and Medicaid in Tables 3 and 4. For the linear probability model, a positive
coefficient indicates an increase in the probability of use for Medicaid enroll-
ees, after the start of the managed care period, while a positive coefficient in
the second continuous part of the model indicates a greater level of service use,
measured in dollars, for those who have accessed the relevant service system.
The results show a strong increase in the probability of all kinds of jail
use for persons on Medicaid after the introduction of managed care. There
does not seem to be a change in the quantity of use, measured in dollars,
conditional on using any jail services. The results show a statistically significant
increase in the probability of having some psychiatric or nonpsychiatric jail
hotel costs and in the probability of receiving jail mental health services. The
magnitudes may appear small, generally less than one-tenth of one percentage
point, but given that the overall probabilities are also less than one percent,
this is a large relative increase. For example, during the managed care period,
the probability of any nonpsychiatric jail days increased by 0.19 percentage
points for Medicaid enrollees and the overall average in the data was around 3
percent, an increase of over 5 percent.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Independent Variables (Unweighted)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Policy
Managed Care 0.692 0.461 0 1
Managed Care  Medicaid 0.535 0.499 0 1
Medicaid Indicator 0.773 0.419 0 1
Managed Care  Time Trend 30.6 23.1 0 66
Time trend 34.0 19.0 1 66
New Jail 0.328 0.469 0 1
Demographics
Age 35.3 10.6 18 64
Female 0.485 0.500 0 1
Black 0.173 0.378 0 1
Asian 0.050 0.217 0 1
Native American 0.028 0.165 0 1
Hispanic 0.019 0.135 0 1
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In contrast to the increase in the probability of the three kinds of jail costs
for Medicaid enrollees, we find no significant change in the probability of
using the state mental hospital by Medicaid enrollees and a decrease in state
mental hospital costs for users.
We find a significant increase in the probability of nonzero expenditures
for county outpatient services after the implementation of managed care. This
result does not necessarily reflect an increase in utilization, but is likely due to
an artifact of the payment mechanism. After managed care, the county paid
providers a capitated fee even when no services are provided and thus it is
likely that payments were made for more individuals than were actually using
services in any given month after the carve-out.
Because there are individual-level fixed effects, and Medicaid is a time-
invariant variable as defined in our data, the Medicaid dummy variable is not
included in the fixed-effects regression. Using a monthly Medicaid enrollment




















MC  0.00079nn 0.000154  0.00032nn  0.00011 0.00335nn
(0.00026) (0.000097) (0.0001) (0.00024) (0.00011)
MC  Medicaid 0.00185nn 0.000353nn 0.000429nn 0.00030 0.010465nn
(0.00015) (0.000059) (0.000062) (0.00018) (0.000076)
MC  Time Trend  0.000025n  0.000019nn  1.05e-06 7.13e-06  0.00022nn
(0.000011) (4.05e-06) (4.37e-06) (0.000010) (6.40 e-06)
Time Trend 0.000034nn 0.000015nn 4.83e-06  0.000012 0.00018nn
(0.000013) (4.66e-06) (5.07e-06) (0.000013) (8.00e-06)
New Jail 0.00010 0.000038  0.00019nn
(0.00014) (0.000051) (0.000052)
Demographics
Age  0.00023n  0.000054  0.0000836n 0.00006  3.47e-06
(0.00011) (0.000038) (0.000040) (0.00011) (0.000061)
Observations
Total 2,587,978 2,587,978 2,587,978 2,587,978 2,587,978
Unique Persons 41,463 41,463 41,463 41,463 41,463
npo.05;
nnpo.01.
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indicator potentially creates endogeneity problems, because individuals are
precluded from Medicaid enrollment during prison or jail sentences. This
policy is evidently not always enforced as we found some individuals listed as
being on Medicaid when they were in prison or jail. We decided to use an
indicator of ever-enrolled in Medicaid to mitigate endogeneity problems. We
examined this variable for evidence that more enrollment occurred later in the
sample period, which may indicate either strategic enrollment behavior by
participating providers possibly in response to managed care incentives or that
persons increase in the severity of their illnesses over time and thus are more
likely to be eligible for Medicaid services. A trend toward more Medicaid
enrollment conditional on ever enrolling did not occur in our data; in fact, the
conditional probability of enrollment in a given month was smaller later in our
study period over the rate earlier in the sample.
The only individual-level time-varying covariate is age. Older persons
tend to have a lower probability of use, and this effect is statistically significant
Table 4: Person Fixed-Effects Model of Monthly Expenditures in 2001



















MC  66nn  387  18 373  316nn
(23) (207) (14) (234) (12)
MC  Medicaid  3 53 1.0  710nn  203nn
(14) (143) (9.8) (180) (11)
MC  Time Trend 2.03n 2.7 0. 83  4 1.39nn
(0.90) (8.4) (0.58) (11) (0.49)
Time Trend 5.57nn 14.6  0.39 3  4.51nn
(1.04) (9.4) (0.64) (13) (0.55)
New Jail 71.0nn 128  9.0  20nn
(13) (121) (7.0) (2)
Demographics
Age 11.2 81  6.4  121  4
(8.9) (79) (5.1) (100) (3)
Observations
Total 87,768 17,012 18,617 14,056 384,186
Unique Persons 17,729 5,298 6,054 1415 21,117
npo.05;
nnpo.01.
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for nonpsychiatric care and mental health services. The gradual decline in
the use of services with age for persons with severe mental illness has been
found by others (e.g., Domino and Salkever 2003; Lindrooth, Norton, and
Dickey 2002).
The coefficient on the uninteracted managed care term indicates the
difference for non-Medicaid persons in the probability of use before and after
the start of the managed care contract. This coefficient is statistically significant
in the jail and county outpatient cost models (see Table 3). The time trend
indicates that the probability of any jail use increased before managed care,
and decreased afterward.
In models predicting the amount of jail use, conditional on any use
(Table 4), the interaction between Managed Care and Medicaid is never sta-
tistically significant in any of the jail models. Therefore, controlling for other
factors, the amount of jail use for those who accessed the jail system did not
change after the start of the managed care contract. This may indicate that a
shift toward more severely ill jail users did not accompany the increase in the
likelihood of use or that if it did occur, such persons did not receive more
intensive care as measured in dollars while incarcerated in jail.
Payments for county mental health services for service users decreased
substantially after managed care, especially for Medicaid enrollees, on the
order of a $300 per month decrease for non-Medicaid enrollees and a $500
per month decrease for Medicaid enrollees. While this type of result may be
the marker of a successful capitation program from the county’s perspective, it
may also fuel the cost-shifting results found in the probability models.
Combining the results from the two parts on the full sample, we can
calculate the predicated effect of managed care on Medicaid enrollees’ total
costs. We find an overall increase in spending on nonpsychiatric jail hotel costs
of $1.30 per person per month (bias-corrected bootstrapped 95 percent con-
fidence interval of $0.45 to $1.81) and on psychiatric jail hotel costs of $0.73
per person per month (CI $0.04 to $1.62). If five percent of the approximately
one million persons between ages 18 and 64 in King County during our study
period are in the Medicaid program, we estimate a total annual shift of $1.13
million to the jail sector (CI $0.58M to $1.61M), or almost 2 percent of the jail’s
1996 adapted budget. We also find an increase in jail mental health service
costs of $0.07 per person per month (CI $0.01 to $0.11), less than 1 percent of
the Department of Public Health’s 1996 adopted budget. We find a decrease in
spending on state mental hospital costs of $1.67 (CI decrease of $13.38 to an
increase of $7.77), but since the confidence interval includes zero, we cannot
rule out the hypothesis of no cost-shifting to the state psychiatric hospital
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system. As evidence to fuel a cost-shifting motive, we find an average reduc-
tion on county-funded outpatient mental health expenditures of $7.65 per
person per month (CI $12.48 to $1.14), translating to a total annual savings of
almost $4.6M (CI $0.7M to $7.5M) or 6.3 percent of the county’s 1996 out-
patient mental health budget.
Robustness Analysis
There is obviously considerable variation in the mental health needs and
utilization patterns of Medicaid enrollees, our control group. Because no in-
dependent assessment of mental illness was available in our data, we opted to
use the full set of individuals enrolled in the Medicaid program, even though
doing so understates our results on mental health service users. We reesti-
mated the full set of models on a subset of our sample comprised of users of
county mental health services (results not reported). This group is likely more
homogenous in their mental health service needs, but it may substantially
undercount mental health users, as many may seek mental health services
from the primary care sector (Wells et al. 1989). We obtain virtually identical
results to those reported here in sign, significance, and magnitude of the re-
sults; the one exception is that the managed care–Medicaid interaction be-
came positive and statistically significant in the first part of the state hospital
model, indicating an increase in the probability of using state hospital services
after the implementation of managed care for this population. We also reran
all models on a further subset of county mental health users, those with one or
more diagnoses of severe mental illness. As expected, we find similar results
from the two-part model in sign and significance, although the magnitude of
the coefficients from the linear probability model were 60–187 percent larger.
This indicates that the effects of increasing jail use were concentrated in the
severely mentally ill population.
Breakpoint Sensitivity Analysis
We conduct a breakpoint analysis, similar to Piehl and colleagues (1999), using
the technique of Andrews (1993) to test for the period over which a break in
the parameter estimates could be determined. In other words, this procedure
allows us to examine whether a significant change occurred in the probability
of use of the services we examined above, but perhaps at a time period dif-
ferent than specified in the models (April 1995). We strongly reject the hy-
pothesis that there was no structural break in the parameter estimates for all
four sets of two-part cost shifting models during the period surrounding the
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actual policy shift on April 1995 using a 10 percent trimming rate, supporting
our original findings
CONCLUSIONS
We found evidence of indirect cost-shifting toward the jail and decreasing
mental health expenditures in the county outpatient mental health system. We
found a statistically significant increase in the probability of jail use, both
psychiatric and nonpsychiatric, after the start of managed mental health care
for Medicaid enrollees. A series of robustness checks in the full sample and
subsamples of mental health users and the severely mentally ill were sup-
portive of these findings.
The implications from our analyses are important for policy. First, our
results show that there is a trend away from deinstitutionalization of persons
with mental illness. However, instead of reinstitutionalization in mental hos-
pitals, or even general hospitals, the institutionalization is in jails. Second, it is
likely that the treatment of mental illness is less effective in jail, even when
psychiatric care is provided, than in a hospital specializing in care for the
mentally ill. Third, the overall cost of care is likely to be greater, when count-
ing both the short-term and long-term costs. Fourth, this trend, like the de-
institutionalization that started in the 1960s, is driven in large part by eco-
nomic incentives instead of best treatment considerations.
While the exact mechanism is not explored in this analysis, these results
may point to a potentially troubling trend if the provision of mental health
services in the jail setting is not as efficient as it is on an outpatient basis due to
additional costs of housing, guards, and other features of the jail. The human
costs, both intangible and in terms of future labor market participation, are of
course outside the scope of our analysis, but no less troubling.
We also find evidence that expenditures on state mental hospitals de-
creased during the managed care period, even though this system is a free
good to the capitated mental health providers. We can think of three possible
explanations for this finding. This could be explained by decision making at a
level higher than that of the county mental health system (e.g., the state); for
example, there may have been policies implemented at the state hospital
during the managed care period that disproportionately targeted Medicaid
enrollees for reductions in lengths of stay. It is also possible that there was
greater capacity in the jail health system rather than the state mental hospital
system. A third explanation could be increased access to outpatient treatments
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such as psychotropic medication as a result of the change to managed care,
perhaps through better oversight, which resulted in shorter stays and therefore
lower expenditures to those admitted to state mental hospitals; however, this
third explanation does not support the jail results reported here.
Caveats of our results should be noted. First, if other policies were im-
plemented in the Medicaid population on or after April 1995, we are at risk of
attributing those effects to the implementation of managed care. We have met
with many local personnel in the King County area and have discussed other
possibilities, but no credible competing explanation was unearthed. However,
we cannot rule out other explanations. Second, we do not examine total
Medicaid expenditures for this population in this paper, but leave that to
future work. Although some county mental health visits are reimbursed
through the Medicaid program, many are not, and these visits are not oth-
erwise captured in our data. Increases in the use of private sector providers
may have occurred which could potentially increase the study population’s
access to mental health care and offset the own-cost reduction that was ob-
served. However, such a finding would not mitigate our finding of consid-
erable cost-shifting to the jail sector. Finally, while we have made every effort
to reflect actual expenditures by each of the sectors studied in this analysis, it is
possible that the administrative data sets that we have used may misstate
agency costs. In addition, we incorporated the best measure of psychotropic
medication costs that we could access, but it is likely that this estimate may not
accurately reflect medication expenditures during the full study period, al-
though the reliance on donated medications makes the actual expenditures a
very small percentage of the public health department budget.
This article provides another example of how changes in mental health
financing can have unintended consequences (e.g., Frank, Goldman, and
Hogan 2003). In this case, changes in financing for mental health treatment
appears to have led to increases in expenditures in a completely different
sector. This points to the need for careful consideration when designing
changes in the financing of any complex health system.
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